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The Environmental Effect of Green Taxation:  
the Case of the French “Bonus/Malus” 
Abstract 
At the beginning of 2008 was introduced in France a feebate on the purchase of new 
cars called the “Bonus/Malus”. Since January 2008, less polluting cars benefit from a 
price reduction of up to 1,000 euros, while the most polluting ones are subject to a 
taxation  of  2,600  euros.  We  estimate  the  impact  of  this  policy  on  carbon  dioxide 
emissions in the short and long run. These emissions depend on the market shares 
and the average emissions per kilometer of each car, but also on their manufacturing, 
car fleet size and the average number of kilometers travelled by their owners. We first 
develop  a  simple  tractable  model  that  relates  car  choice  and  mileage.  We  then 
estimate  this  model,  using  both  the  exhaustive  dataset  of  car  registrations  and  a 
recent  transportation  survey  which  provides  information  on  individual  journeys. We 
show  that  if  the  shift  towards  classes  benefiting  from  rebates  is  spectacular,  the 
environmental  impact  of  the  policy  is  negative.  The  reform  has  notably  increased 
sales, leading to an important increase in manufacturing and travelling emissions. We 
thus stress that such policies may be efficient tool for reducing CO2 emissions since 
consumers do react to such financial incentives, but should be designed with care to 
achieve their primary goal. 




L’impact du bonus/malus écologique 
sur les émissions de CO2  
Résumé 
La politique du « Bonus/Malus écologique » a été introduite en France début 2008. 
Depuis janvier 2008, les voitures les moins polluantes bénéficient d'une réduction à 
l'achat qui peut aller jusqu'à 1 000 euros, alors que les plus polluantes sont soumises 
à une taxe de 2 600 euros. Nous estimons l'impact de cette politique sur les émissions 
de dioxyde de carbone à court et long terme. Ces émissions dépendent des parts de 
marchés et des émissions moyennes au kilomètre des voitures, mais également de 
leur fabrication, de la taille du parc et du nombre moyen de kilomètres parcourus. 
Nous développons un modèle simple et tractable qui relie le choix de la voiture et le 
kilométrage.  Nous  estimons  ce  modèle  en  utilisant  la  base  exhaustive 
d'immatriculations des véhicules neufs et la dernière enquête Transport qui fournit des 
informations sur les déplacements individuels. Nous montrons que si le report vers les 
véhicules bénéficiant d'un bonus a été spectaculaire, l'impact environnemental de la 
politique a été négatif. Cette réforme a nettement augmenté les ventes, se traduisant 
par  une  augmentation  importante  des  émissions  liées  à  la  production  et  à  la 
circulation de ces nouvelles voitures. Nous soulignons ainsi qu'un tel dispositif peut 
être  efficace  puisque  les  consommateurs  réagissent  fortement  aux  incitations 
financières correspondantes, mais qu'il est nécessaire de les calibrer avec attention. 
Mots-clés : taxation environnementale, automobiles, émissions de CO2, évaluation de 
politiques publiques 
Classification JEL : C25, L53, Q53 1 Introduction
Public awareness on environmental issues has raised in the past decade and global warming
is now a growing concern for rich and emerging nations. Policy initiatives are launched in
many countries to reduce the human contribution to greenhouse gas emissions, especially
carbon dioxide (CO2). Cutting automobile emissions is a crucial objective, as the trans-
portation sector accounts for a large share of the CO2 emissions (one third in France in
2008, 28% in the US in 2004),1 and this share keeps on growing.
To reduce emissions stemming from transportation, a ﬁrst solution, adopted by European
northern countries, is to implement Pigovian taxes.2 Such taxes have however proved very
unpopular, as the recent attempt by the French government to implement a carbon tax
attests.3 A second solution, implemented recently in California, British Columbia and the
European Union, is to impose low carbon fuel standards. Such norms, however, are in
general ineﬃcient. Holland et al. (2009) show they may even lead to an increase of net
carbon emissions, by stimulating the production of low carbon fuel. Finally, feebates have
recently received attention as an alternative way of internalizing pollution externalities.
Their principle is to provide a rebate (resp. a fee) for purchasers of low-emitting (resp.
high-emitting) new cars. Up to now, feebates have been implemented in Austria, France
and Wallonia (a Belgium region), and are debated in other European countries (see Adamou
et al., 2010).4 In France, this feebate, called the “Bonus/Malus écologique”, emerged as
one of the main propositions of an environmental roundtable which took place by the end
of 2007. It was implemented quickly after, at the beginning of 2008.
The main objective of such policies is to modify consumers’ preferences in favor of greener
cars. In the French case, this objective seems to have been achieved in a short period of
time, as the share of cars whose emissions are below 120g of CO2 per kilometer doubled
within a few months. In the long run, feebates may also induce manufacturers to foster
1For France, see the report: http://www.citepa.org/emissions/nationale/Ges/Emissions_FRmt_GES.pdf.
For the US, see the report of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2006).
2For a comprehensive survey of environmental taxation, see for instance Fullerton & West (2002) or
Fullerton et al. (2008).
3A tax of 17 euros per ton of CO2 was adopted by the French Parliament in December 2009 but rejected
by the Constitutional Court. Because of its unpopularity (including in the French governing party), the
French government ﬁnally decided not to replace it by another device.
4Even if feebates have not been adopted yet in other European countries, most of them (17 in April
2010) have implemented a taxation which is more or less related to the average CO2 emissions of the
vehicles (for more details, see for instance the ACEA site). California also proposed in 2007 a feebate
system called the “Clean Car Discount” program on new cars, but it was suppressed in 2008.
3innovation in favor of less emitting cars. It is worth emphasizing, however, that several
adverse eﬀects can hamper the impact of the changes in the demand induced by the feebate
policy on CO2 emissions. As an indirect taxation of CO2 emissions, feebates are subject to
the well-known “rebound eﬀect”, namely that with more more fuel eﬃcient vehicles, drivers
would travel more, thus mitigating the initial reduction of emissions. Another related issue
is that the rebates were so important in the French case that the system increased notably
total sales.5 This scale eﬀect translates into extra CO2 emissions by an increase in mileages
and the manufacturing of these new vehicles.6 Hence, at the end, the eﬀect of the policy
on CO2 emissions is not necessarily positive.7
In this paper, we estimate the impact of the French feebate on CO2 emissions stemming
from individuals, taking most of these eﬀects into account.8 In order to recover the coun-
terfactual emissions that would have prevailed in the absence of the feebate, we propose a
simple demand model that combines car and annual mileage choices. This model has the
advantage of accounting for consumers’ heterogeneity, the diﬀerentiation of the automo-
bile market and the existence of rebound eﬀects, while remaining very simple to estimate.
Besides, it allows us to estimate separately mileage and vehicle choice parameters. This is
convenient since our empirical analysis is based on two datasets that cannot be merged.
The ﬁrst is the exhaustive monthly dataset of car registration in France, which provides
detailed information on both new vehicles and car owners. The second is a transportation
survey conducted in 2007 which records in particular annual mileages on a large sample of
French households. These two datasets allow us to recover both choices with and without
the feebate system, and average emissions related to car use for a particular choice of car.
5A crucial parameter of a feebate system is the “pivot point” that divides vehicles charging fees from
those receiving rebates, and the rate that speciﬁes the fee or rebate as a function of distance from the pivot
point (see Greene et al., 2005). In the French case, these parameters were calibrated in order to make the
system neutral for the State budget. But ex post the measure turned out to cost 285 millions euros in
2008.
6The manufacturing of a new car generates 5.5 tons of CO2 per ton of new vehicle (see ADEME, 2010).
The emissions stemming from scrapping of old vehicles may also be important. We do not include them
in our analysis because of data unavailability.
7For a discussion of the optimal design of a feebate system, see for instance Greene et al. (2005) or
Peters et al. (2008).
8We restrict ourselves to private owners, as we do not have information on the mileage of company
cars. These vehicles were already subject to a speciﬁc tax in favor of the less polluting cars and have
probably less reacted to the introduction of the feebate. We do not analyze either the eﬀect of the policy
on manufacturers due to a lack of accurate data. We do not have data on automobile industry, and observe
sales until January 2009, i.e. only 13 months after the introduction of the feebate. This appears too short
for estimating supply-side eﬀects that are more likely to arise in the long run. We perform however a
sensitivity analysis on the eﬀect of such reactions on our ﬁnal results.
4As a result, we can recover the total CO2 emissions under the feebate policy and without
it. Another option, chosen e.g. by Feng et al. (2005), relies on the model of Dubin &
McFadden (1984) that mixes choices between several discrete options (the vehicle model)
and a continuous variable (the mileage). However it would require to observe in one single
dataset cars choices and mileages, whereas the transportation survey only records mileages
for the year 2007, not precise car choices.
Thanks to our detailed monthly dataset, we estimate the model using sales just before and
after the reform took place. As the reform was announced only by the end of October
2007, manufacturers were not able to modify immediately their vehicles characteristics,
apart from prices. We estimate a reduced form that combines the demand model relat-
ing market shares with characteristics and a price model. An advantage of this approach
over the traditional separate estimation of demand and supply is that we do not need to
observe real transaction prices. The validity of price models hinges on a correct observa-
tion of real prices. However, as usually when studying the car industry, we observe list
prices rather than transaction prices. Whereas it is likely that the policy has resulted in a
quick adjustment of transaction prices, we do not observe such changes in the list prices.
The diﬀerence between transaction prices and list prices is thus correlated with the fee-
bate, making this measurement error problematic. Our approach does not suﬀer from this
endogeneity limitation.
We show that if the magnitude of the shift towards the classes beneﬁting from a rebate
is very important, the environmental short-run impact of the feebate is actually negative.
This result can be explained by three main eﬀects. First, the policy has signiﬁcantly
enhanced total sales, resulting in particular in an increase in manufacturing. This stresses
the need for a careful design of the feebate policy, in order not to generate such negative
eﬀects from the demand side. The rebound eﬀect also reduces part of the gain due to
the shift in consumers’ purchase towards less emitting vehicles. Finally, this disappointing
result is also due to threshold eﬀects. Buyers shift their purchase to cars beneﬁting from
rebates but with hardly lower emissions. This overall negative assessment of the feebate
policy is robust to various assumptions. In particular, it still holds if we neglect rebound
eﬀects.
We also perform an analysis of the long-run impact of the policy (still ignoring supply-side
reactions). In the short run, the demand shift due to the feebate corresponds to a very small
part of the whole ﬂeet of cars. It is thus important to estimate what would happen with
the replacement of the whole ﬂeet. Computing such a long-run impact is however delicate.
A crucial issue is the potential impact of the policy on the replacement rate of cars: as
5emphasized for instance by Adda & Cooper (2000), such replacement eﬀects may be large.
In the absence of accurate data on car replacement, we consider two scenarios. In the ﬁrst,
we neglect the impact of the policy on the replacement rate. In the second, we consider a
simple dynamic model with competitive prices in the second-market, following Engers et al.
(2009). In this case, the change in replacement rates is related to changes in initial prices.
Both scenarios lead to a large negative impact of the policy. Once more, this mainly results
from the fact that the feebate leads to an increase in automobile equipment, inducing more
car use emissions. This eﬀect widely overcomes the composition eﬀect stemming from
changes in car choices. As previously, and even if the long-run eﬀects are more sensitive
than the short-run ones to some assumptions, our overall conclusion is robust to several
departures from our preferred model. It still holds without any rebound eﬀects, and even
if the policy had induced a large reduction by manufacturers of the average emissions of
their vehicles.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the reform and the datasets
at our disposal. The third part presents the parameters of interest and our identiﬁcation
strategy. Finally, the fourth part displays our results.
2 First insights on the policy
2.1 The feebate system
The feebate system on new cars sales was introduced by the French government in Decem-
ber 2007. The purchasers of new cars emitting less than 130g of CO2 per kilometer beneﬁt
from a direct price cut on their invoice. The amount of the rebate varied, depending on the
class of the vehicle (see Table 1) with a maximum of 1,000 euros, and even 5,000 euros for
electric cars, which still however represents a negligible share of the market. Conversely,
purchasers of cars emitting more than 160g of CO2 per kilometer had to pay a tax of up to
2,600 euros. The system was neutral for cars emitting between 130 and 160 g per kilome-
ter.9 In practice, rebates applied to new cars ordered on or after 5 December 2007, while
fees applied to vehicles ﬁrst registered in France on or after 1 January 2008. At the same
moment, the government introduced a scrapping subsidy of 300 euros (called the “super
bonus”) for more than 15 year-old automobiles, provided that the purchaser bought a new
vehicle emitting less than 160g of CO2. Given the age condition, this additional rebate
9The classiﬁcation corresponds to the one deﬁned by the European Union for the cars energy labels,
except that the government split the A, C and E classes into two subclasses.
6was however provided in only 5.4% of the purchases of vehicles beneﬁting from a rebate
(see Friez, 2009).10




Average Price Market shares
(g/km) (2007) (2007)
A+ 60 5,000 - -
A- 61-100 1,000 12.500 0.0%
B 101-120 700 15.500 18.4%
C+ 121-130 200 19.000 10.2%
C- 131-140 0 19.000 18.8%
D 141-160 0 23.000 26.6%
E+ 161-165 -200 23.500 3.2%
E- 166-200 -750 29.000 15.9%
F 201-250 -1,600 40.000 5.0%
G 251 -2,600 60.500 1.9%
Note: we observe no sales for class A+ in 2007.
It is worth emphasizing that the feebate policy was decided and then implemented with
unusual speed. It resulted from a national environmental roundtable organized in Autumn
2007 by the newly elected president, whose aim was to deﬁne the key points of government
policy on ecological and sustainable development issues for the coming ﬁve years.11 The
concrete measures, including the feebate system, were presented on 25 October 2007, for
an almost immediate application. This roundtable and the feebate policy came as quite
a surprise as they were not mentioned during the electoral campaign and the right-wing
government party was considered not to be preoccupied with environmental issues.
This green taxation for the purchase of new cars by private owners has no precedent in
France in magnitude and scope. Some measures already intended to increase the popula-
tion’s awareness of the environmental costs of motor vehicles. But for private users, they
either focused on very speciﬁc segments of the market only, or were larger in scope but
marginal in magnitude. Examples include an income tax reduction to the purchasers of
hybrid vehicles, or a very slight taxation of the most polluting vehicles (around 100 eu-
ros for cars costing on average 35,000 euros). In contrast, the feebate introduced at the
10This scrapping subsidy was extended to 1,000 euros and to cars between 10 and 14 years in 2009, in
order to dampen the economic consequences of the 2009 crisis on car industry. We shall not be concerned
with this here as we focus on 2008 only.
11This roundtable was called “Grenelle de l’Environnement" as an evocation of the “Accord de Grenelle"
concluded in May 1968, see http://www.legrenelle-environnement.fr/spip.php?rubrique112.
7end of 2007 applied to all cars, the rebate representing up to 8.8% of the list price of the
corresponding cars, while the penalty could be as large as 14.1% of this price.
The objective of the feebate system was twofold. First, it intended to shift consumers’
demand towards low CO2-emitting cars. Secondly, it aimed at encouraging manufacturers
to develop greener vehicles. To better achieve this second purpose, it was mentioned from
the beginning of the reform that the thresholds of eligibility for the rebates and imposition
of the fees were to be lowered, at a pace allowing manufacturers to adapt their production
(5g of CO2/km every two years). As a result, the thresholds were decreased in January
2010. Less expectedly, the amount of the rebates were also moved at the same date (from
1,000, 700 and 200 euros to 700, 500 and 100 euros, respectively), in order to make the
feebate system cost-neutral. Although the initial values of the rebates and fees were already
decided according to this criterion, the system turned out to cost around 285 million euros
to the state in 2008 because of its overwhelming success in favor of low CO2-emitting cars.
2.2 Demand reaction
We use the exhaustive dataset on the registration of new cars from January 2003 to January
2009 provided by the Association of French Automobile Manufacturers (CCFA, Comité des
Constructeurs Français d’Automobiles). It includes all the information that is necessary
for the registration of a new car, i.e. some characteristics of the car (brand, model, CO2
emissions, list prices, type of fuel, number of doors, type of car-body, horsepower, weight
and cylinder capacity) as well as a few information on the owner (professional activity,
age and the city he lives in). These informations allow us to deﬁne the products at a
rather detailed level (see the appendix for more details), and take into account consumers’
heterogeneity.
As the implementation of the measure was almost immediate, neither consumers nor man-
ufacturers could anticipate the reform before November 2007. On the other hand, Figure
1 shows that anticipation was spectacular on consumers’ side in December 2007, especially
for the most polluting cars for which the fee only applied in January 2008. Not surprisingly,
this large increase for the last classes was followed by an “undershooting” in January and,
to a lesser extent, in February. As we do not seek to measure anticipations or undershoot-
ing eﬀects, we exclude subsequently December 2007 as well as January and February 2008
from our analysis. We do not observe any noticeable change in November even though
the reform was already announced then. This is probably due to the delivery time of new
cars, as well as the shift between the purchase and registration of a new car. Similarly,
8we observe a jump in the sales of the less polluting cars in January only, even though the
measure was already in force for vehicles ordered after the 5th of December. This stems
from the fact that owners of cars bought in December had to register it after the 1st of


















































Vehicles affected by a fee
Figure 1: Evolution of the market shares of the diﬀerent classes of CO2
emissions.
Figure 1 also highlights the importance of the changes in the market shares of the classes
of energy after the reform took place. While class B only represented 20% of sales at the
end of 2007, its market share reached nearly 50% at the beginning of 2009. In the same
time, the market share of class E- fell from nearly 15% to 5%. These variations are all the
more striking that the feebate only represents a modest fraction of list prices, around 4.7%
for class B and 2.6% for class E-. It thus seems diﬃcult to rationalize these changes by
pure price eﬀects only.12
These changes induce a signiﬁcant impact on average emissions (see Figure 2). This eﬀect
is however much smaller than the one observed on market shares. Compared to the trend
between November 2005 and November 2007, the average decrease between March 2008
and January 2009 only reaches 5%.13 This mainly results from threshold eﬀects: many
buyers have probably only marginally modiﬁed their purchasing decisions, choosing for
instance a car emitting 120 g/km (thus belonging to class B) instead of one emitting 121
or 122g/km (belonging to class C+). This fact is conﬁrmed by the density of average
12D’Haultfœuille et al. (2010) provide evidence that the feeebate has shifted the individual preferences
towards lower CO2-emitting vehicles.
13We restrict ourselves to the period after November 2005 as the CO2 emissions label became compulsory
at this date. There is an acceleration in the decrease of average CO2 emissions after this period (see
D’Haultfœuille et al., 2010).
9emissions of new cars bought just before and just after the reform (see Figure 3). The
shifts have mainly been towards the most polluting models of the lower classes. We also
see that these threshold eﬀects already existed before the introduction of the feebate. This
may be due to the fact that consumers value energy classes per se. Since May 2006,
manufacturers have to display the European Union energy labels indicating the energy
class of their new cars, so that these classes were known by the consumers in 2007. It may
also stem from the pre-existing taxation of company cars, already based on these classes
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Figure 2: evolution of the average CO2 emissions of new cars.




Figure 3: Density of average CO2 emissions of new cars sold in 2007 and
2008.
10The gains in the average emissions of new cars is an interesting insight on the eﬀect of the
policy, but does not translate directly into gains in total CO2 emissions. A ﬁrst reason is
that it does not incorporate the emissions due to the production of new cars. A second
reason is the large heterogeneity in the yearly mileage of drivers, which is also related to
the characteristics of the car. This heterogeneity is likely to aﬀect the ﬁnal impact of the
policy. In the following, we take this dependence into account using the Transportation
Survey conducted by the French national institute of statistics (INSEE) in 2007. This
survey provides detailed information about individuals traveling (in particular the annual
mileage of their car) and on the characteristics of their vehicles, such as their type of fuel,
weight or average CO2 emissions. Table 2 summarizes the average number of kilometers
covered by the cars depending on their characteristics and those of the owners. Results
conﬁrm the importance of taking the heterogeneity in the yearly mileage into account.
Drivers who choose a heavy (and thus large) car, or those who choose a diesel one, make
much more kilometers per year than the others. People with high income as well as these
who work and who live in rural areas also use their car more intensively.
Table 2: Average yearly mileage (in kilometers) as a function of the
characteristics of the owner or of the car.
Variable Yearly mileage (kms)
Weight (in kilograms)
Less than 900 11,073
Between 900 and 1,100 12,156
Between 1,100 and 1,300 15,228
















11The introduction of the feebate seems also to have had a positive eﬀect on total sales. A
simple comparison of the quarters that we use subsequently, namely the one from Septem-
ber to November 2007 and the one from March to May 2008, shows that total sales increase
by around 13.4%.14 This increase is spectacular as this period also corresponds to an im-
portant increase of fuel price, which was likely to reduce the total sales of new vehicles.
2.3 Supply reactions
Apart from the eﬀects on the demand side, an explicit goal of the reform was also to stim-
ulate the reduction of CO2 in a second round, by triggering innovation by manufacturers
to produce lower CO2-emitting cars. It seems diﬃcult to evaluate such eﬀects with data
only up to 13 months after the introduction of the feebate policy. Still, we can study
manufacturers reaction in the short-run by looking at the evolution of average emissions of
cars that are sold each month, without weighting each product by their sales to eliminate
composition eﬀects of aggregate demand.15 Figure 4 shows an acceleration of technical
changes around the beginning of 2007. This may be due to the fact that European Union
energy labels became compulsory in May 2006. On the other hand, we do not observe
any shock in 2008. As the policy was announced very lately, manufacturers did not have
time before January 2008 to adjust their production to the reform. Even if it is technically
possible to modify horsepower (and thus CO2 emissions) quickly, the vehicle with its new
characteristics must be certiﬁed before being distributed. This process typically takes sev-
eral months. More substantial technological changes are likely to take even more time. A
rough quantitative analysis of the number of patents on the corresponding domains16 does
not show any particular acceleration during this period. This result is also consistent with
the one of Pakes et al. (1993), who observed a two-year shift between the increase in the
fuel price following the ﬁrst oil crisis and the corresponding technical innovations.
14The conclusion is similar (13.8%) if we consider the quarter from March to May 2007 instead of the
one from September to November 2007 to avoid possible seasonal eﬀects.
15We suppose that a model is available for sale at a given month if we observe at least one sale before or
at the given month and one sale after or at the given month. To avoid boundary eﬀects (at the beginning
or at the end of the period, only vehicles with enough sales are included, and these vehicles tend to have
lower CO2 emissions), we drop the ﬁrst and last six months.
16According to the European Patent Oﬃces, the patents corresponding to the domains for engine (in
the innovation patent classiﬁcation, F02B, F02D et F02M for fuel engine and B60L for electric ones) does
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Figure 4: Evolution of average CO2 emissions before and after the reform.
Apart from CO2 emissions, we should expect manufacturers to compensate the eﬀects of
the measure by increasing prices of the cars beneﬁting from rebates while decreasing those
with fees, to soften the shifts in demand resulting from the policy. However, we do not
observe systematic diﬀerences between classes of emissions in the evolution of list prices at
the period of the reform (see Table 3). A natural explanation is that list prices are typically
modiﬁed only once a year, so that between March and May 2008, many list prices were not
adjusted yet to the reform. To explore further this issue, we also computed the evolution
during the year 2008. We observe a rise in prices of B and C+ classes vehicles, but no
sharp decrease for high-emitting vehicles. Thus, it seems that either standard predictions
of the theory are wrong or that list prices, as proxies of transaction prices, are unreliable
(or both). This is the reason why we do not rely on list prices subsequently, and prefer to
use a reduced form approach rather than modeling both the demand and supply.17
17It is possible to consistently estimate a demand model with measurement error in prices because
prices are instrumented anyway. Yet, consistent estimation of the supply models requires to observe prices
without errors.
13Table 3: Evolution of average prices (in %) before and after the reform.
Class
of CO2 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
B 0.32 -1.16 1.92 1.03 -0.22 1.60
C+ -1.36 2.01 2.79 -0.28 0.71 1.81
C- and D 0.76 0.88 1.78 1.39 -0.01 0.77
E+ 0.55 0.16 0.37 0.44 0.74 0.54
E- 0.75 0.99 0.04 0.49 0.75 0.98
F 0.62 -0.14 0.48 -0.71 0.85 1.36
G 0.51 -0.82 0.69 -0.66 0.61 0.07
Reading notes: For year t = 2003 to 2007, changes in prices are computed between
September to November of year t and March to May of year t+1. For year 2008, changes
in prices are computed between March to May 2008 and September to November 2008.
Results for class A are not reported due to the few number of sales until 2007.
3 Methodology
3.1 Parameters of interest
Before presenting our identiﬁcation strategy, we deﬁne the parameters of interest. We both
consider the short-run and long-run eﬀects of the measure on CO2 emissions. The ﬁrst
corresponds to emissions between March and May 2008,18 while the second corresponds
to quarterly emissions in a long-run scenario deﬁned below. The latter is probably the
most relevant parameter, since in the short run the policy only aﬀects new cars, which
represent each month less than 1% of the whole stock of cars. In the long run, with the
progressive replacement of the whole stock, the policy is expected to produce more eﬀects.
The identiﬁcation of this impact relies on strong assumptions however, while the short-run
impact can be identiﬁed under rather mild conditions.
Let us ﬁrst deﬁne the short-run eﬀect of the policy. Let d 2 f0;1g denote the policy status
(d = 1 if the feebate is introduced, d = 0 otherwise) and Y (d) 2 f0;:::;Jg denote the new
car chosen by an individual between March and May 2008 with policy status d. As usual,
choice 0 is the outside option, which represents either the non-replacement of an old car
by a new one (or its replacement by a second-hand car), or the use of an alternative mean
18We focus on the period from March to May 2008 because, as mentioned previously, January and
February are aﬀected by the “undershooting” eﬀects mentioned previously.
14of transportation. For j 2 f1;:::;Jg, let Aj(d) denote vehicle j average CO2 emissions per
kilometer. When j = 0, average emissions A0(d) is random and depend on the vehicle the
individual already owns.19 Because CO2 emissions depend on the emissions per kilometer
of cars chosen by the consumers, but also on mileages, we also deﬁne Nj(d) as the mileage
done by an individual with vehicle j between March and May 2008. Finally, we take into
account emissions stemming from the manufacturing of new cars, and let Mj denote the
emissions of producing car j (so that by deﬁnition, M0 = 0). The emissions of an household
with policy status d satisfy
CO2(d) = 1fY (d) = 0gA0(d)N0(d) +
J X
j=1
1fY (d) = jg(Mj + Aj(d)Nj(d)):
Then the short-run average eﬀect of the policy on total carbon dioxide emissions satisﬁes

SR = nE [CO2(1)   CO2(0)];
where n is the number of potential buyers. To take into account heterogeneity among
individuals in both the purchase of cars and annual mileages, we separate individuals
according to some observable characteristics X, namely activity, geographical area and
income (for more details on these variables, see Appendix A.2). Letting X 2 f1;:::;Kg,
we then have SR =
PK
















where, for d 2 f0;1g, we let sxj(d) = P(Y (d) = jjX = x), Ex0(d) = E(A0(d)N0(d)jY (d) =
0;X = x) and Nxj(d) = E(Nj(d)jY (d) = j;X = x).
To understand better the eﬀects at stake, let us decompose this expression. We denote
by A(1), Nx(1) and M the average emission of the new cars with the policy, the average
mileage done by individuals with characteristics x using new cars with the policy and
the average production emissions of these new cars, respectively. For any counterfactual
variables (U(0);U(1)), we denote the impact of the policy on this variable by U =
19Because we do not have precise information on the emissions stemming from other means of trans-
portation (such as buses or individuals using vehicles they do not own) in the Transportation Survey, we
will neglect hereafter average emissions for individuals who do not own a car.



































The ﬁrst component corresponds to the change in the composition of new cars in favor of
less CO2-emitting cars. If the policy is well-designed, this component should be negative
(thus contributing to a decrease in the overall level of CO2 emissions). We expect for
instance the sales of the less polluting cars, i.e. those for which Aj(1) A(1) < 0, to increase,
i.e. sxj > 0. These less polluting cars are also smaller in average, so that the average
emissions caused by the production of a new car should be smaller, sxj(Mj   M) < 0.
However, three other eﬀects may mitigate this positive composition eﬀect. The feebate
scheme is designed on (easily observed) emissions per mileage Aj(1), but the result also
depends on the ﬁnal use of cars (Nxj(1)). Because of the rebound eﬀect, individuals may
increase their mileages as the cost per kilometer of their car decreases. It is thus likely
that Nxj(1)   Nx(1) > 0 for the less polluting cars. Besides, the decomposition makes
it clear that the policy impact depends on a scale eﬀect. If total sales increase because
of the policy, the production of these new cars and the corresponding traveling emissions
lead to a rise in CO2 emissions. This is partly, but only partly, oﬀset by the fact that
these new cars in excess are used instead of older ones (the term  Ex0
PJ
j=1 sxj), and
older cars are the higher emitting ones. Finally, the ﬁfth component in the decomposition
corresponds to what we call second-order eﬀects. The ﬁrst term in it corresponds to the
change in outside emissions due to the policy. This eﬀect is small in the short run because
the composition of the whole stock of cars is hardly aﬀected by the reform after just a few
months. The second term corresponds to changes in average emissions of an individual
with car j due to the policy. Such a change may be due to a supply side eﬀect (Aj < 0
if manufacturers react to the policy) and a selection eﬀect (individuals who choose vehicle
j diﬀer with and without the feebate, so that Nxj may change). We however expect
the former to be negligible in the short run, and the latter to be small once controlled for
observed heterogeneity X.
16Let us now turn to long-run eﬀects. Noteworthy, due to limitations in our data, we still
abstract from supply side eﬀects here. More generally, we assume that the automobiles
supplied in the long run are those who were already proposed at the beginning of 2008. We
also suppose that the sales of new cars and annual mileages remain constant each quarter
after the beginning of 2008.20 Hence, the only diﬀerence with the short run is that in this
long-run scenario, the whole ﬂeet of cars has been replaced.






(sxj(1)   sxj(0))Mj + (e sxj(1)Aj(1)Nxj(1)   e sxj(0)Aj(0)Nxj(0)); (3.3)
where e sxj(d) denotes the share of individuals of type x equipped with model j with policy
status d in this long-run scenario. As previously, we neglect emissions corresponding to
other means of transportation here.
For the sake of interpretation we propose the same type of decomposition as above. First,
it is useful to notice than in a steady-state equilibrium we have the following relationship
between the share of the car j in the whole ﬂeet and its share in the ﬂow of new cars:
e sxj(d) = Txj(d)sxj(d); (3.4)
where Txj(d) is the average lifetime of vehicle j when bought by individuals of type x under
policy status d. We ﬁrst consider a scenario where the cars’ lifetime is the same for all
20Thus, we abstract from potential transitory eﬀects in sales, i.e. that sales just after the reform may not
correspond to sales a few months later. If the policy aﬀects the optimal replacement of cars (as explained
below), there is a decrease in the optimal lifetime of smaller cars and an increase in the optimal lifetime
of bigger ones, so that many individuals ﬁnd it optimal to replace their (small) car at the beginning of the
period, while a large part of individuals with bigger cars postpone their decision to replace their car. As
our estimation period started two months after the policy took place, most of these adjustments should
have already been done. This is supported by the fact that we do not observe any rise in the average level
of CO2 emissions a few months after the introduction of the feebate (see Figure 2).









































The change in emissions due to the production of new cars over a quarter is the same as in
the short run, whereas the one of the composition eﬀect is far larger, the ﬁrst term in the
brackets being multiplied by T x (around 80 quarters in our sample) The rebound eﬀect is
also T x times larger, while the traveling scale eﬀect is multiplied by an even larger factor,
as it is not mitigated anymore by the fact that in the short run, new cars substitute to
older (and thus more polluting) ones.
This scenario suﬀers however from the fact that the price diﬀerential due to the feebate is
likely to modify renewal choices. On a related issue, Adda & Cooper (2000) for instance
present evidence that changes in the scrapping value have signiﬁcant impact on cars life-
time. We expect that vehicles with a fee are kept on a longer period than those beneﬁting
from a rebate, so that their share in the whole ﬂeet is larger than their shares in total sales,
partially oﬀseting the impact of the policy (as sxjTxj < 0). On the other hand, larger
average lifetimes means that the increase in total sales due to the policy does not increase
that much the share of individuals owning a car, mitigating the traveling scale eﬀects. This
replacement rate eﬀect is thus potentially ambiguous. To assess its importance, we still
suppose that Txj(0) = T x but Txj(1) 6= Txj(0). In this case, using (3.3), (3.4) and the












3.2 A theoretical model of car and mileage choices
The short and long-run eﬀects of the policy depend on several variables that are not ob-
served directly in our dataset: the counterfactual variables Y (0), Aj(0) and Nj(0), but also
18mileages Nj(1) (we only observe, in the Transportation Survey, annual mileages in 2007).
Several assumptions are thus needed to identify these eﬀects. To this end, we develop
a theoretical model that links car choice and mileage and takes into account consumers’
heterogeneity. Let us consider an individual of type x under policy status d. We suppose










x + f1x(Zj)d + xj(d) + ej; (3.7)
where y is the income, pj(d) corresponds to the transaction price of vehicle j with policy
status d (including the feebate if d = 1), rx is the discount rate, Zj is the fee of vehicle j
under the feebate policy (Zj < 0 if j beneﬁts from a rebate)22 and xj(d) represents other
observable and unobservable characteristics of the vehicle. cj(d) (resp. c0(d)) is the cost
per kilometer of vehicle j (resp. for an individual who chooses the outside option). We
suppose that 0 < x < 1 and x < 0, so that utilities are increasing, concave functions
of N. The dependence in x of (x;x;rx;f1x;xj(d)) reﬂects the heterogeneity in the way
people value the corresponding characteristics of the car. Noteworthy, this speciﬁcation
allows for the possibility of a direct eﬀect of feebates on demand (through f1x(Zj)), apart
from their indirect eﬀect through price variations. There is indeed evidence that the reform
has had an impact on the environmental awareness of consumers beyond prices eﬀects (see
D’Haultfœuille et al., 2010). On the other hand, we suppose that f1x(0) = 0, and impose
that the policy has not aﬀected fuel prices and automobiles characteristics other than
prices.
Assumption 3.1 (No short-run eﬀect of the feebate on cars characteristics apart from
price) For all x;j, xj, Aj and cj do not depend on d.
Assumption 3.1 implies in particular that manufacturers did not modify immediately av-
erage emissions of their vehicles because of the reform. As already discussed in Subsection
2.3, this condition is likely to hold here. Combined with the assumption on the cost per
kilometer, it also implies that the fuel price is unaﬀected by the introduction of the feebate.
Individuals are supposed to maximize their utility both in N and j. For a given j, the










21This model is close to standard models of vehicle choice (see, e.g., Berkovec & Rust, 1985, or Goldberg,
1995), except that we also take into account mileage here.
22For the outside option, p0(d) = 0 and Z0 = 0.
19This relationship is at the basis of the so-called rebound eﬀect, since it indicates that
individuals will increase their mileage following a reduction of the cost per kilometer of
their car (as soon as x < 1). Plugging N
j into (3.7), the utility of choosing j is equal to
U(j;d) = (y(d)   pj(d))x   c
x
j x + f1x(Zj)d + xj + ej;






. To recover the market shares of each product corresponding
to the above utilities, we make some distributional assumptions on the residuals e e0;e1;:::;ej
(where e e0 = c
x
0 x + e0).23 To get realistic substitution patterns between the outside
option and new cars, while keeping the model simple to estimate, we rely on a nested
logit model speciﬁcation, following, e.g., Berkovec & Rust (1985) or Goldberg (1995). The
ﬁrst nest is the set of all new cars, while the second nest is the outside option. We thus
suppose that e e0;e1;:::;ej are identically distributed and follow a Gompertz distribution. e e0
is independent of (e1;:::;ej), while these latter are correlated through a common factor :
ej = x + (1   x)j:
The (j)j=1:::J are independent, follow a Gompertz distribution and are independent of .24




[ln(sx0(d))   x ln(1   sx0(d))   x0   pj(d)x
 c
x
j x + f1x(Zj)d + xj

; (3.9)
where, as previously, sxj(d) = P(Y (d) = jjX = x). Finally, we posit the following
relationship between pj(0) and pj(1).
Assumption 3.2 (Dependence of transaction prices on the feebate scheme)
pj(1) = pj(0) + f2(Zj) + f3(e Zj);
where e Zj is the sum of fees of vehicles produced by the ﬁrm that produces j and f2(0) =
f3(0) = 0.
This assumption should be seen as a ﬂexible approximation of a price model. We include
e Zj because when ﬁxing price of j so as to maximize its proﬁt, the ﬁrm should take into
account its eﬀect on the proﬁt stemming from j but also from the other cars it produces.
23We consider e e0 instead of e0 because c
x
0 is a random term which varies from one individual to another
(contrary to c
x
j ). It should therefore be included in the error term.
24The distribution of  is implicitly deﬁned by those of ej and j and this independence restriction.
Cardell (1997, Theorem 2.1) shows that there exists a unique distribution satisfying these conditions, for
each value of x 2 [0;1].
203.3 Identiﬁcation strategy
To identify the short-run eﬀects, we have to recover average quarterly mileages, outside
emissions and the counterfactual market shares. Long-run eﬀects rely on additional re-
strictions which are detailed separately.
3.3.1 Average mileages
Our theoretical model provides us with a convenient form for average quarterly mileages,
that vary according to individual characteristics and the cost per kilometer of the chosen
cars. Real data do not exactly correspond to this stylized model however, and we have
to take into account diﬀerences between the deterministic rule given by Equation (3.8)
and actual data. We postulate the following relationship between anticipated and actual
mileages (denoted Nt hereafter). Because we use the Transportation survey which measures
mileages at a diﬀerent period (the year 2007), we introduce a period index t hereafter. t1
refers to the quarter between March and May 2008, while t0 corresponds to the quarter
between September and November 2007.
Assumption 3.3 (Link between anticipated and actual mileages) We have
lnNt = lnN

Yt(d)t + x + t;
where x is a x-speciﬁc constant, t is independent of (Yt(d);A0t(d);ct) conditional on X,
E(tjX = x) = 0 and the distribution of t does not depend on t.
The important restrictions are that the distribution of the error term does not depend on
t, and is independent of the car choice and the cost per kilometer.25 As a consequence, the
average mileage Nxjt for car j is only determined by the cost per kilometer and does not
depend on the policy. This means that we neglect here the aforementioned selection eﬀects
that may aﬀect the second-order term in (3.2) and (3.5). We come back to this issue in
Subsection 4.3.
By Equation (3.8) and Assumption 3.3, we have
lnNt0 = e x + (x   1)lnct0 + t0: (3.10)
where e x is a x-speciﬁc constant. Under Assumption 3.3, E(t0jlnct0;X) = 0. This means
that we can estimate by OLS x, that will correspond to the extent of the rebound eﬀect, e x
25On the other hand, Assumption 3.3 allows for both biased and unbiased anticipations, the latter
holding when E(exp(x + t)jN
Yt(d)t) = 1.
21and the distribution of the residuals t0. These parameters will provide us with a measure
of the average mileage by type of individual Nxjt1 using (see Appendix A.4 for the proof)




Recall that the outside option is the decision not to buy a new car at a given period. Total
emissions corresponding to this option depend on the share of individuals who do not have
a car, and on the distribution of average emissions on the stock of existing cars. In the long
run, both are likely to be aﬀected by the feebate policy. On the other hand, it seems very
plausible that they remain constant in the short run. We state this formally in Assumption
3.4. We let hereafter F0t(d) denote the type of fuel of the car owned by an individual when
choosing the outside option (F0t(d) = 2 for a gasoline car, 1 for a diesel one and 0 if the
individual does not have a car).
Assumption 3.4 (No short-run eﬀect of the policy on the stock of existing cars) For all
i, the distribution of (A0t(d);F0t(d)) conditional on Y0t(d) = 0 does not depend on d and t.
Under Assumptions 3.3-3.4, average outside emissions at period t1 are identiﬁed by (see
Appendix A.3 for the proof)
Ex0t1(1) = Ex0t1(0) = I
x 1
1 P(F0t0(0) = 1)Ex0t0;1(0) + I
x 1
2 P(F0t0(0) = 2)Ex0t0;2; (3.12)
where If is the ratio between fuel price of type f 2 f1;2g at period t1 and at period t0,
and Ex0t0;f(0) are the average outside emissions for individuals such that F0t0(0) = f:
Ex0t0;f(0) = E(A0t0(0)N0t0jYt0(0) = 0;Xt0 = x;F0t0(0) = f):
3.3.3 Counterfactual market shares
Finally, we have to recover the counterfactual market shares at period t1, sxjt1(0), to
identify short-run eﬀects. For that purpose, we diﬀerentiate Equation (3.9) over time (to
eliminate any ﬁxed eﬀect) and replace prices by their expression given in Assumption 3.2.
This reduced form is suﬃcient to obtain the counterfactual market shares that appear in
the short and long-run eﬀects. Besides, an advantage of this approach over the traditional
separate estimation of demand and supply is that we need not observe the real transaction
prices, which are necessary for a correct estimation of the price model. As emphasized in
Subsection 2.3, it is likely that the measurement error resulting from the use of list prices
is correlated with the feebate. Our approach does not suﬀer from this endogeneity issue.
We rely instead on the following exogeneity condition.
22Assumption 3.5 (Exogenous residuals in market shares and no systematic trend in the
short run) E("xjjZj; e Zj;cjt1;cjt0) = 0, where "xj = x0t1 x0t0 (xjt1 xjt0)+x(pjt1(0) 
pjt0(0)).
This condition is satisﬁed if the evolution of the characteristics of vehicle j (the term xjt)
are unrelated to its feebate and to its cost per kilometer. As detailed in Subsection 4.3, we
can partially test for this assumption by checking that variations in market shares between
two years preceding the feebate introduction do not depend on classes of emissions.
Note that ln(sx0t(d)) is very small in absolute value compared to ln(1   sx0t(d)) (around


















where f4x(z) = (f1x(z) f2(z)x)=(1 x), f5x(z) =  f2(z)x=(1 x) and e x = x=(1 x).
To estimate this equation, we use the estimate of x obtained before. We also assume
for simplicity (although not needed for identiﬁcation) that x=(1   x) = x0, f4x(z) =
P7
l=1 1fz = zlgl (where (zl)l=1:::7 denotes the diﬀerent nonzero values for the feebate) and
f5x(z) = z. We can then identify these parameters by simple OLS.26 Using Equation
(3.9) and Assumption 3.1, it is then possible to recover the counterfactual market shares
for individuals of type x (see Appendix A.4 for details).
3.3.4 Long-run eﬀects
The identiﬁcation of the long-run eﬀects of the policy requires stronger restrictions. As
explained above, it depends on the long-run shares of individuals equipped with model j
with policy status d 2 f0;1g, namely e sxjt1(d). By Equation (3.4), this depends in turn
on Txjt1(d), the average lifetime of vehicle j when bought with individuals of type x at t1
under policy status d.
Unfortunately, as far as we know, no French data provide recent information on cars
lifetime. In particular, the data used by Adda & Cooper (2000) no longer exist. As a
result, we have to make quite restrictive assumptions. The ﬁrst is that we posit a constant
average lifetime across vehicles before the introduction of the feebate, Txjt0 = T t0. In this
case e sxjt0 = T t0sxjt0 for all j  0, so that by summing over j, we have
T t0 =
1   e s0t0
1   s0t0
;
26 is identiﬁed because f4x(0) = f5x(0) = 0.
23and we can recover T t0 using the Transportation Survey. Our computation gives us an
average value of around 80 quarters, consistent with the oﬃcial statistics (the monthly
ﬂow of new cars represents 0.5% of the stock of cars less than 15-year old, leaving us with
an estimated value of 67 quarters).27 We also assume that average lifetimes at t1 without
the policy would have remained the same as in t0, so that Txjt1(0) = T t0
Finally, to identify lifetimes at t1 with the policy, we consider two scenarios, consistent
with the two decompositions (3.5) and (3.6). In the ﬁrst, we assume that the policy does
not modify replacement rates.
Assumption 3.6 (No eﬀect of the feebate on average lifetimes) For all j 2 f1;:::;Jg,
x 2 f1;:::;Kg and d 2 f0;1g, Txjt1(d) = T t0.
This scenario implies that the increase in sales observed in the short run leads to a pro-
portional overall increase in the equipment rate of the French population. If extreme, this
assumption is not fully unrealistic. If the share of the French households with at least one
car is rather stable in recent years (slightly above 80%), the multiequipment rates has more
than doubled in less than thirty years : 35.8% of French households has at least two cars
in 2008 while this rate was only 16.5% in 1980, and policies such as the feebate may still
increase this multi-equipment rate.
We also consider a scenario where lifetimes adjust to the policy. We propose in appendix a
simple model inspired by Engers et al. (2009), which leads to the following approximation:
Assumption 3.7 (Impact of the policy on cars lifetime before scrapping) For all j 2













Simple algebra shows that behicles beneﬁtting from a rebate are renewed more often, as
expected. The importance of the adjustment depends on the quarterly discount factor r
of individuals (supposed to be independent of x here), the (quarterly) depreciation rate in
the utility ﬂow corresponding to the use of a vehicle, r2, and sale prices pjt1(d). In practice,
we set r = r2 = 0:987, corresponding to an annual interest rate (resp. depreciation rate)
of 5%.
27Oﬃcial statistics are available for cars less than 15-year old only, and are not restricted to cars owned
by households, both leading probably to a negative bias of the true lifetime we aim to estimate.
244 Results
We now turn to the estimation of our model. We follow the steps of our identiﬁcation
strategy. First, we estimate the mileage demand corresponding to Equation (3.10) from the
Transportation Survey. This provides us with an estimate of the parameter x reﬂecting the
dependency of mileage in the cost per kilometer. We can then compute outside emissions
from Transportation survey, using (3.12). Second, we estimate the reduced-form of the
demand model (Equation (3.13)) that links the change in market share of cars to the
introduction of the feebate, using the dataset on new cars registrations. This provides
us with the counterfactual market shares that would have prevailed in the absence of the
feebate policy. Finally, the short and long-run eﬀects are computed.
4.1 Mileage and outside option emissions
We ﬁrst use the Insee Transportation Survey to estimate the dependence between mileage,
the cost per kilometer and the household characteristics (as expressed in Equation (3.10)).
This allows us to compute average mileages (deﬁned in Equation (3.11)), average outside
emissions (see Equation (3.12)) and to obtain an estimator of x that we then plug in the
market shares Equation (3.13). Actually, we suppose that this elasticity of the mileage to
the cost per kilometer x does not depend on the type of household x (interaction terms
introduced in the regression between X and the cost per kilometer were not signiﬁcant
at the 5% level). We also suppose that the household characteristics e x are linear in the
dummies of activity, geographical area and income. Results are displayed in Table 4.
25Table 4: Estimates of the mileage model (log) according to households






Rural and suburban area  0:013
(0:014)
Income in 2nd quintile 0:077
(0:027)
Income in 3rd quintile 0:141
(0:025)
Income in 4th quintile 0:21
(0:024)
Income in 5th quintile 0:245
(0:024)
Cost per kilometer (   1)  0:536
(0:027)
Reading note: Mileages are computed on the
whole 2007 year. Signiﬁcance levels:  1%,
 5%,  10%.
We thus obtain b    1 '  0:54. To compare this estimate with previous results, mostly
based on variations in fuel price (either with macro or micro data), recall that the actual
cost per kilometer satisﬁes cYitt = fYittAYitt, where fjt is the fuel price for vehicle j at
date t. A change in the fuel price induces both a modiﬁcation of cYitt and AYitt, because
individuals may change their car according to fuel price ﬂuctuations. Thus, by Equation
(3.10), and letting "N (resp. "A) denote the price elasticity of mileage (resp. of average
emissions per kilometer), we get




We thus expect    1 to be smaller in absolute value than the price elasticity of fuel
consumption, which is equal to "N + "A. Our results are consistent with this prediction,
the usual estimates of the long-run elasticities lying between -0.8 and -0.6 (see, e.g., Graham
& Glaister, 2002 for a survey).28 Interestingly, it is also very close to the estimates given by
Johansson & Schipper (1997), who separately estimate "N and "A on 12 OECD countries
and obtain for France "N =  0:33 and "A =  0:38, leading to "N=(1 + "A) '  0:53.
28These estimates are usually obtained on macro data. Noteworthy, our result is also smaller in absolute
value than the price elasticity obtained on micro data by Clerc & Marcus (2009) in France, namely -0.70.
264.2 Eﬀect on CO2 emissions
To evaluate the impact of the measure on market shares, we estimate the reduced form of
our nested logit model, using Equation (3.13).








Rural and suburban area 0:315
(0:13)
Income in 2nd quintile 0:092
(0:215)
Income in 3rd quintile  0:138
(0:207)
Income in 4th quintile  0:042
(0:209)
Income in 5th quintile 0:406
(0:212)
Other terms
Cost per kilometer  3:763
(0:141)
Rebate = 1:000 e 0:3847
(0:2086)
Rebate = 700 e 0:6982
(0:0292)
Rebate = 200 e 0:0113
(0:0288)
Fee = 200 e  0:257
(0:0374)
Fee = 750 e  0:2808
(0:0221)
Fee = 1:600 e  0:1484
(0:0328)
Fee = 2:600 e  0:1468
(0:0491)
Sum of fees of the ﬁrm 0:003
(0:0004)
Reading notes: signiﬁcance levels:  1%,  5%,  10%.
As expected, market shares of vehicles beneﬁting from a bonus increase at the expense of
those aﬀected by a penalty (Table 5). The penalty eﬀect appears however strongly concave,
as the negative impact of the fee is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for almost all classes penalized
by a fee. Finally, and as expected, the estimated coeﬃcient of the cost per kilometer is
signiﬁcant and negative (-3.76).
27We check informally the quality of our demand and price models by comparing the market
shares observed in 2007 with those predicted by our model in absence of the feebate policy.
The model reproduces quite accurately the market shares observed in 2007 (see Table 6).
We observe slight (but insigniﬁcant) diﬀerences for some classes, as the model indicates
that the share of classes C+ and D would also have increased, absent the reform. On the
other hand, the share of the most polluting cars would have decreased. Such predictions
are consistent with the sharp increase in fuel price observed at the beginning of 2008 (the
gasoline price was for instance 15% higher than in September-November 2007). Overall,
the average gain in terms of CO2 emissions of new vehicles is equal to 3.9%, which perfectly
matches the observed gain on our subsample. Another important indicator to look at is
the prediction of the model on global sales. According to our estimates, the policy has
increased sales by 13.2%. This eﬀect is substantial but consistent with the increase in sales
of 13.4% observed between September-November 2007 and March-May 2008. It will prove
to have large consequences on the eﬀect of the policy on total emissions.
Table 6: Comparison between the observed market shares and those
predicted by the model (%).
Observed Prediction


















Reading notes: the market shares do not include
the outside option and thus sum to 100%. Stan-
dard errors were computed by bootstrap (with
1,000 simulations).
The overall eﬀects of the policy, both in the short and long run, are displayed in Table
7, while the decomposition of these eﬀects are presented in Table 8. Emissions stemming
28from the manufacturing of new cars were computed by assuming that the production of a
new car generates 5.5 tons of CO2 per ton of new vehicle, following the carbon assessment
of the French agency for environment (see ADEME, 2010).
In the short run, the composition eﬀect of the change in the composition of the new
cars’ sales reaches approximately -80.4 kilotons of quarterly CO2 emissions, well above (in
absolute value) the rebound and traveling scale eﬀects. Hence, the measure would have
been positive without the manufacturing eﬀects. However, this latter eﬀect dominates in
the short run, representing around 232.1 kilotons of quarterly CO2 emissions. As a result,
we obtain a signiﬁcant increase in the short run of around 168.4 kilotons per quarter. With
a cost of the ton of CO2 ﬁxed at 32 euros (consistent with Yohe et al. (2007) meta-analysis),
the overall environmental short-run cost of the measure would reach 5.4 million euros per
quarter.
Table 7: Short and long-run eﬀect of the feebate policy.
Estimates
% of total
Parameter Kilotons Million of euros emissions




















Note: we consider a price of 32 euros for a ton of CO2. Standard errors were
computed by bootstrap (with 1,000 simulations). Signiﬁcance levels:  1%, 
5%,  10%.
29Table 8: Decomposition of the short and long-run eﬀects.
Estimates (kilotons)

















Replacement rate eﬀect  495
(123:1)
Note: we consider a price of 32 euros for a ton of CO2.
Standard errors were computed by bootstrap (with 1,000
simulations). Signiﬁcance levels:  1%,  5%,  10%.
As expected, we obtain far higher eﬀects in the long run. When ignoring the potential
impact of the feebate on cars lifetime, the impact on quarterly emissions is higher by
a factor 9. While in the short run, the main component of the negative impact is the
manufacturing emissions, traveling emissions predominates in the long run. As a result,
we estimate that the introduction of the feebate accounts for an increase of 13.7% in total
automobile emissions.
Our results also indicate that taking into account lifetime adjustments is important. We
estimate signiﬁcant lifetime changes, the average lifetime of class B vehicles decreasing
by 14% while the one of class G cars increasing by 23%. For instance, starting from a
lifetime of 20 years without the reform, we obtain a lifetime of around 17 years for a class
B vehicle with initial price pjt1 = 12;000 euros, and of 30 years for a class G vehicle taxed
by 2,600 euros with initial price pjt1 = 30;000 euros. These modiﬁcations do not alter our
basic conclusion, however. We still predict an increase of quarterly emissions, even if this
increase is reduced by one third (1,029.8 Kilotons of CO2). This reduction mostly stems
from the fact that the average lifetime over the whole stock decreases. As a result, the
policy would lead in this scenario to a 8.4% increase of the whole stock, far smaller than
the 13.2% increase corresponding to the previous scenario.
304.3 Robustness checks
Several tests are performed to assess the robustness of our results. The ﬁrst is related
to the rebound eﬀect. This eﬀect is commonly evoked in cases where the sole energetic
eﬃciency is aﬀected (for instance in the case of the choice of a heating system). However,
the car choice may also aﬀect mileage through other channels than the cost per kilometer.
One could imagine that the rebound eﬀect may be partially oﬀset by a comfort eﬀect:
people choosing smaller vehicles may decrease their mileage because these vehicles are less
comfortable. To assess the importance of the rebound eﬀect in our ﬁnal results, we ﬁx  to
1 and estimate the demand model (3.13) and total emissions under this constraint. Results,
displayed in Table 9, show that the policy still leads to an increase of CO2 emissions in the
short and long run under this favorable assumption.
Table 9: Robustness checks: Short and long-run eﬀects on quarterly
emissions under alternative assumptions.




























Note: Standard errors were computed by bootstrap with 1,000 simulations. Sig-
niﬁcance levels:  1%,  5%,  10%.
Related to this, we have ignored so far selection eﬀects by supposing that individuals
choosing vehicle j with the policy made the same number of kilometers than those choosing
vehicle j without the policy (Nxj(1) = Nxj(0)). This may not be the case, however, as
the two populations are likely to diﬀer. If it is very diﬃcult to measure precisely such
eﬀects, we try to assess the sensitivity of our results to these eﬀects by supposing that
Nxj(1) = (1 )Nxj(0) and computing  so that SR;LR
1 or LR
2 are equal to zero. We
obtain SR ' 0:37, LR
1 ' 0:13 and LR
2 ' 0:08. These estimates would imply an increase
in the long run of the total number of kilometers traveled of respectively 2 and 1.7%. This
seems implausible given the important estimated increase in the stock of car (respectively
3113.2% and 8.4%) and the possibility of rebound eﬀects.29 In other words, it seems to us
that selection eﬀects cannot reverse the overall result that the policy increases total CO2
emissions.
Another potential limitation of our estimates is that they do not account for the possibility
of manufacturers reactions. As noted previously, extra data would be necessary to address
this question in details. Still, it is possible to check whether this eﬀect is likely to reverse
our conclusions. We consider a situation where the policy would lead to a 5% reduction of
all average emissions. This reduction is very important, as it corresponds to the average
decrease in the average CO2 emissions of new vehicles proposed by manufacturers between
January 2003 and July 2008 (see Figure 4). Such a decrease would have several impacts
on the stock of automobiles. Looking at the decompositions (3.2) and (3.5), it would
increase (in absolute value) the composition eﬀects but also the rebound, traveling and
manufacturing scale eﬀect. At the end, however, and as expected, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates
the others, and the policy would lead to a smaller increase of CO2 emissions (169.5 kilotons
in the short-run, 757.4 kilotons in the long-run with changes in replacement rates). Still,
our basic conclusion remains unchanged.
Finally, underlying our identiﬁcation strategy is the idea that feebates Zj in Equation (3.9)
only captures changes in prices (and possibly a direct eﬀect of the feebates themselves)
following the introduction of the policy. We rule out by Assumption 3.5 the possibility
that Zj captures changes on other characteristics of the cars. If this were the case, we would
wrongly attribute the observed changes to the impact of the feebate system. Of course, we
cannot directly test this assumption, but we perform hereafter a falsiﬁcation test, using
the 2006-2007 period instead of 2007-2008. More speciﬁcally, we make as if the measure
had been adopted in 2007 instead of 2008, falsely attributing the corresponding feebates
to cars in 2007. If our assumption is true over the all period, the coeﬃcients corresponding
to the emissions classes should be equal to zero. Table 10 shows that their estimates
are far smaller than those obtained for 2007-2008, even if several remain signiﬁcant.30
For instance the parameter corresponding to the class B is more than 7 times smaller
than when comparing 2007 to 2008. Next, computing the short and long-run placebo
estimates, we obtain estimates not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (the point estimates are
respectively -12.5 kilotons and -106.2 kilotons, i.e. around 10 times lower in magnitude
than our estimates on 2007-2008). Overall, this test strongly suggests that the possible
bias underlying our identiﬁcation strategy does not question our ﬁnal results.
29SR is even less realistic, as it would predict a decrease of the total mileage in the short-run.
30This may be due to long-run evolutions in preferences for low emitting cars among French consumers.
See D’Haultfœuille et al. (2010) for a detailed analysis on this issue.
32Table 10: Estimates of the demand model on 2006-2007.
Parameter Estimate
Rebate = 1;000 e not identiﬁable
Rebate = 700 e  0:091
(0:027)
Rebate = 200 e  0:155
(0:025)
Fee = 200 e 0:081
(0:031)
Fee = 750 e 0:074
(0:019)
Fee = 1;600 e 0:047
(0:024)
Fee = 2;600 e 0:123
(0:041)
Sum of fees of the ﬁrm  0:00007
(0:0003)
Reading notes: OLS estimates of the coeﬃcients on Zj and e Zj in Equation
(3.13) on 2006-2007. Signiﬁcance levels:  1%,  5%,  10%.
5 Conclusion
Overall, the impact of the policy is much disappointing. If this kind of evaluation nec-
essarily relies on several assumptions (especially for a long-run assessment), our global
conclusion that the policy increases CO2 emissions appears robust to several changes in
the speciﬁcations. This does not invalidate, however, feebate systems as eﬃcient tools
for environmental policy. French consumers have strongly reacted to ﬁnancial incentives
created by the policy. The problem rather comes from the design of this feebate. In the
French case, the ﬁrst-order terms in the policy eﬀect are manufacturing or traveling scale
eﬀects. The most important point, to ensure a positive environmental eﬀect of such fee-
bate policies, should thus to calibrate it in order to decrease or keep constant total sales.
Simulations indicate for instance that if the rebates had been shifted (i.e., 700 e instead of
1,000e for class A-, 200e instead of 700e for class B, 0e instead of 200e for class C+),
the policy would not have had any signiﬁcant impact on CO2 emissions (see Appendix A.5
for more details).
One limitation of our study, due to a lack of appropriate data, is that we do not include
manufacturers reactions. Even if, as mentioned before, these reactions are unlikely to
modify our conclusions, stimulating innovation in favor of less polluting cars was another
objective of the measure. We leave the evaluation of these supply-side eﬀects for future
research.
33A Appendix
A.1 Deﬁnition of products
As detailed above, we model the automobile market as a market of diﬀerentiated products,
where potential buyers will have diﬀerent valuation for cars given characteristics such as
brand or type of fuel. In practice, we deﬁne a product by a set of characteristics. An
important issue is then to choose which characteristics one should keep in this deﬁnition.
On the one hand, if products are deﬁned with few characteristics, very diﬀerent items
are mixed together, possibly leading to strong aggregation biases if the underlying model
of demand is not linear, which is the case here. On the other hand, keeping too many
characteristics leads to small market shares for each product, or even null markets shares as
exactly similar cars are often not sold each month. The theoretical model presented before
links the logarithm of the markets shares with the observed characteristics. Thus, null sales
are not used, which leads to a selection bias.31 As a compromise, we select the brand, the
model, the type of fuel, the type of car-body (urban, station wagon, convertible, etc), the
number of doors and its class of CO2 emissions. This selection leads to deﬁne 950 diﬀerent
products (see Table 11) for the period between September and November 2007. Thus, we
adopt a slightly more restrictive deﬁnition of a product than Berry et al. (1995). Even so,
the dispersion of the remaining characteristics (such as price) within each product is not
that small compared to the overall dispersion (see Table 12). A more restrictive deﬁnition
of products (by including, e.g., horsepower) would reduce this dispersion but at the cost
of increasing the proportion of null sales. Our deﬁnition allows us to keep this proportion
of null sales relatively small on the whole population of buyers (15% of the models with
positive sales between September and November 2007 have not been sold between March
and May 2008).
31The existence of null sales is a consequence of the ﬁniteness of the French population, and does not
invalidate the model. If the market share of a product is 10 9, it is very unlikely that it is sold during a
given quarter in France.
34Table 11: Number of products and number of sales between September
and November 2007
Models Number of sales
Overall 950 239,606




By type of car-body




By type of fuel
Gasoline 453 80,390
Diesel 497 159,216
Table 12: Dispersion of prices, CO2 emissions and ﬁscal power of new
cars registered between September and November 2007
Overall Within products
Price (euros) 9,107 1,169
CO2 (g/km) 27.8 2.4
Taxable horsepower 2.4 0.5
A.2 Construction of drivers categories
As mentioned above, we observe in the registration dataset the age, activity and city of the
owners. However, income, which is likely to drive an important part of the heterogeneity
of preferences, is not available. In order to proxy this income, we impute to each purchaser
the median income of his age class in his city, using ﬁscal data.32 Using data from the
French national institute of statistics (INSEE), we also included in our ﬁnal dataset the
32This information is only available for towns of at least 2,000 inhabitants. For cities of more than 50
households but less than 2,000 inhabitants, only the median income is known. In this case, or if the age
of the buyer is unknown, we impute the median income of the city. Sales to individuals living in less than
500 inhabitants cities have been dropped, as the median income is missing in this case. Note that such
sales only represent 5% of the data.
35type of area (urban versus rural or suburban) to which the purchaser belongs. Table 13
displays the average characteristics of new car purchasers in terms of age, income, rate of
activity and type of location computed from the Transportation Survey. Not surprisingly,
these individuals are on average older, belong to richer households and work more often
than the rest of the population.
Table 13: Comparative statistics between characteristics of the buyer of
new cars and the overall French adult population
Variable Buyers of new cars Overall
Activity rate (%) 60.1 58.4
Age (years) 52.3 48.7
Rural and suburban area (%) 41.7 41.1
Median income of the household (%)
First Quintile 10.6 41.1
Second Quintile 15.7 20.1
Third Quintile 24.1 21.7
Fourth Quintile 38.0 24.5
Fifth Quintile 52.3 48.7
To compute market shares, we also need to deﬁne potential markets. We suppose here that
they correspond, for the subpopulation with characteristics x, to the number of individuals
with a driving license at quarter t. We thus assume that individuals cannot purchase more
than two cars during a quarter.
A.3 Computation of the mileage Nt0
Average emissions of CO2 vary from one vehicle to another but also according to the use of
the vehicle. In particular, emissions diﬀer in urban areas and on highways. Let us denote
respectively by A1
j and A2
j the corresponding average emissions for vehicle j. The total







to the mileage in urban area (resp. on high roads) in 2007. We only observe in the CCFA
dataset the average emissions Aj = (A1
j +T 2
j )=2 corresponding to a 50% - 50% mixed use,
which does not necessarily coincide with the real use of the vehicle. To obtain correct total
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j have been obtained on the ADEME website. Note that we do not
observe directly N1
t0 and N2
t0 in the Transportation Survey. To compute them, we consider
that 80% of “regular” travels (all travels except those made for professional purpose outside
commuting, or for vacation) are made in urban areas for people living in a urban area,
and on highways for people living in a rural or suburban area. We consider that other
travels consist of 90 % of highways and 10 % of urban area. These assumptions allow us
to compute N1
t0 and N2
t0 from the total mileage N1
t0 + N2
t0.
A.4 Proofs of Subsection 3.3
A.4.1 Equations (3.11) and (3.12)
Using notations of the model described in Section 3.3, let
gx = E (exp(it)jXi = x):
Note that by Assumption 3.3, gx does not depend on t. Moreover, it is identiﬁed using the
residuals of Equation (3.10). We then have
Njt1 = E [Nit1jYip = j;Xi = x]
= exp(e x)c
d 1
jt1 E (exp(it1)jYit1(1) = j;Xi = x)
= gx exp(e x)c
x 1
jt1 ;
where the third equality stems from Assumption 3.3. Equation (3.11) follows.
First, by the law of iterated expectations,
Ex0t1(0) = P(Fi0t0(0) = 1)Ex0t1;1(0) + P(Fi0t0(0) = 2)Ex0t1;2(0): (A.1)




Third, by Assumptions 3.1 and 3.4, Ex0t1(0) = Ex0t1(1). This, together with (A.1) and
(A.2), proves Equation (3.12).
37A.4.2 Counterfactual market shares
We omit indices x and t here to alleviate the notational burden. In a nested logit where
the utility of individual i for product j satisﬁes Uij = j(d) + "ij, the market share of j

















where g(j) denotes the group of product j and Dg(d) =
P
k2g exp(k(d)=(1   )) for any









k=1 exp(k(0)=(1   ))
i:
By deﬁnition of f4 and f5, we have here j(0) = j(1)   (1   )

f4(Zj) + f5(e Zj)

. Thus,
using (A.3) with d = 1, we get, after some algebra
sj(0) =








k=1 sk(1)exp( f4(Zk)   f5(e Zk))
i:
A.4.3 Eﬀect of the feebate on cars lifetime
We rely on a similar model as Engers et al. (2009). In a dynamic setting, let us assume
that at a quarter k (the purchase of the car occuring at period t), a car can either be sold
on the second market at price e pjt+k or kept, generating a current net surplus of vjt+k. The
value Wjt+k of a car j of age k then satisﬁes the simple relation:
Wjt+k = maxfvjt+k + rWjt+k+1; e pjt+kg;
where r denotes the quarterly discount factor. Supposing that prices perfectly adjust at
equilibrium, we get
e pjt+k = maxfe pjt+k+1;sjg;
where sj represents the scrapping value of car j. As shown by Engers et al. (2009), the
consumer keeps the car while its price remains above the scrapping value. Let us deﬁne by
Tjt this ﬁnal period. We assume that the current net surplus decreases at a constant rate
r2 over time, so that vjt+k = vjrk






2 + re pjt+k+1 if 0  k < Tjt;
sj if k = Tjt:






For standard values of sj (i.e., between 0 and 200 euros), the second term in the right-hand
side is negligible. Writing Equation (A.4) with and without the policy, we obtain Tjt1(1)











In the right-hand side, we approximate the car price without the policy by the observed
price minus the malus, pjt1(0) ' pjt1(1)   Zj.
A.5 Long-run eﬀects of another feebate scheme
Our model allows us to identify the eﬀect of feebate schemes that diﬀer from the one
implemented in 2008. Recall however that to be as ﬂexible as possible, we specify in the
market shares model the eﬀect of the feebate (f4(z)) as a sum of indicators. Thus, we
cannot identify the eﬀect of counterfactual feebate schemes with values of fees that do not
exist in 2008 (i.e., values outside the set f 1;000; 700; 200;0;200;750;1;600;2;600g).
But we can shift these values to diﬀerent classes of emissions. We compute in Table 14
below the eﬀect of a feebate scheme where all rebates are shifted compared to the 2008
ones (i.e., 700 e instead of 1,000e for class A-, 200e instead of 700e for class B, 0e
instead of 200e for class C+). This scheme may be seen as an intermediary between those
implemented in 2010 and 2011. Such a scheme would have led to a reduction in average
CO2 emissions in the long run when taking into account renewal eﬀects. This is mainly
due to the fact that total sales do not increase much in this scenario. As a result, the
traveling scale eﬀect is sharply reduced. As most of the parameter estimates, the estimate
of LR
2 is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, however.






Traveling scale eﬀect 210:5
(434:4)










Note: standard errors were computed by bootstrap (with
1,000 simulations). Signiﬁcance levels:  1%,  5%, 
10%.
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